From Buchenwald, Grotewohl called "the living to action; we urge you not to be paralyzed in the struggle against fascism" and for peace. In June 1945 in their famous "appeal" to the German people, the Communists denounced "the millions and millions" who followed Hitler.
After East Germany's founding the SED regime used commemorative and other occasions to offer a more benign public view of the Germans and GDR as the heirs to a heroic legacy of resistance. (Here one sees interesting parallels with what Henry Russo has called "the Vichy syndrome" and the exaggeration of the scope of resistance in postwar French retrospectives offered by both Gaulliists and Communists). At Buchenwald, "resistance" to war and fascism now meant opposition to West German rearmament. Hence, fighting the cold war was synonymous with Vergangenheitbewältigung.
Gone too from Grotewohl's Buchenwald address was any public declaration of solidarity with the Jews, past or present. Grotewohl used the occasion to attack US and British "acts of aggression in the Middle East against the Arab peoples" and called for struggle against the Bonn government's support of this aggression. 9 He did not mention the Jewish catastrophe.
could not be placed, or that Ulbricht chose not to place, in the service of his ongoing political goals. At the same moment in which he laid claim to the mantle of antifacism, Ulbricht pushed the memory of the Holocaust to the far margins of official commemorative practice.
After the speeches, political dignitaries led a march out of the memorial. The photo of that march is the defining image of East German memory of the Nazi era. It shows Walter
Ulbricht leading the SED leadership out of the Sachsenhausen memorial in 1961. Behind him is the smokestack of the concentration camp and a crowd of people. Otto Grotewohl, Rosa
Thälmann, and other members of the Politburo are among those walking next to Ulbricht. On either side, East German soldiers stand at attention. Ulbricht is waving the politician's wave of victory. The photo could be entitled "communism rises like a phoenix from the ashes of defeat." It was the supremely Hegelian moment, a moment of historical triumph and identification with past heroes and victors rather than with history's tragic and unredeemed victims. But within four months, the regime built the Berlin Wall to stem the flow of refugees from the West.
In West Germany a very different kind of commemorative practice emerged in the postwar years. Though Chancellor Konrad Adenauer supported financial restitution for Jewish survivors and for Israel as part of West Germany's responsibility to accept the burden of the Nazi past, he did not leave behind a distinctive style of Holocaust commemoration, though his reticence to discuss the topic publicly could be said itself to be a style of commemoration.
12 Ulbricht (see note 11 represented an enduring failure to think clearly about politics and morality, or about the nature of the Nazi regime. In contrast to those who wished to place the Holocaust on the fringes of the Nazi era, Schmid insisted that it lay at the core of what the Nazi regime was about, and that Germans understood this to be so at the time. Hence to equate all victims was both morally unacceptable and historically inaccurate. It rested on a distorted and apologetic understanding of the Nazi regime.
In a speech in Frankfurt-am-Main's Paulskirche on March 6, 1955 to the Society for Christian-Jewish Cooperation, Schmid returned to the issue of memory and victimization in postwar discussion. 25 Did not each of us, he asked, hear the biblical question, "Cain, where is your brother?" Don't the shadows who once lived here in this city until they were taken to the gas chambers in Auschwitz direct these words to us from every street and every square? And don't they direct these words also to us on behalf of those millions of other Jews and non-Jews who were murdered as they were?
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There were many, he continued, who thought that the meaning of a week of brotherhood was to "finally forget" the past and again take up a "friendship of forgiveness." After all, they would say:
Life goes on -and furthermore there are certainly also other massive episodes of evil in the world! Wasn't the bombardment of our cities also a horrible thing? A sin against the commandment of humanity and brotherhood? Thus aren't the "others" just as bad as us? In one of these demolished cities, in whose ruins live thousands -not only of soldierly men, but also peaceful women, innocent children -in this city I want to say: It is different if wounds are cause and life is destroyed in the course of …. Military actions, which like falling bombs touch one and not the other, of if one consciously seeks to make a group of people disappear from the face of the earth and is devoted to their annihilation, as was done to the Jews.
[ Neither Goldmann nor the great majority of West German political leaders up to 1989 made explicit the historical connections between memory of the Holocaust and memory of the millions of non-Jews in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union killed by German armies, the SS, and assorted special police units. Goldmann's understandable priority was to bring the memory of Jewish suffering to the center of West German national memory just as it was being repressed from public East German commemorations. While in the East the memory of non-Jewish suffering took priority, in the west, in Bergen-Belsen, the memory of the Holocaust was largely separated from memory of the German race war on the eastern front as a whole. In the era of divided memory, the separation of the memory of the Holocaust from the memory of non-Jewish victims was common in the commemorative practices in both Germanys.
Heuss's speech in Bergen-Belsen became known by its most famous sentence, "No one will ever lift this shame from us." It was the most extensive public reflection to come from a leading official of the West German government regarding the crimes of the Nazi era. It was broadcast on radio and reported in the West German press, especially the liberal press. The
West German government press office reprinted the text. Whoever speaks here as a German must have the inner freedom to face the full horror of the crimes that Germans committed here. Whoever would seek to gloss over, make little of or diminish the depth of these crimes, or even to justify them with reference to any sort of use of was the "breakthrough of biological naturalism" that led to the "pedantry of murder as a sheer automatic process… No one, no one will lift this shame from us." 37 He also rejected appeals to leave the past in the past. "The Jews will never forget, they cannot ever forget what was done to them. The Germans must not, and cannot ever forget what human beings from their own people did in these years so rich in shame." To those who pointed to the misdeeds of "the others" he replied, "I know about all this, and I have never hesitated to talk about it. But to search for excuses by referring to injustice and brutality of the other in the method of those who lack a demanding moral code…" 38 … It seems to me that the scales of virtue [Tugendtarif] with which the peoples defend themselves by comparison with others, is a corrupting and banal affair. It endangers a clear, honorable feeling for one's country which everyone who consciously places himself or herself in its history carries… Every people has in reserve its poets of revenge or, when they get tired, its calculated publicists.
39
Heuss spoke up for a patriotism self-confident enough to honestly face the dark past.
"Honorable feeling for one's country" was not composed of comforting myths and resentment at others. Heuss sought to place the language of patriotism in the service of memory rather than avoidance and resentment. For Heuss, the moral imperative to recall the crimes of the Nazi era was not a burden imposed by the occupiers and victors but an imperative demanded by the better traditions of a still existing "other Germany."
In the speech, "No one will lift this shame from us", Heuss place Jewish suffering at the center of official West Germany. He put the conservative forces in the Federal Republic on notice that he would oppose those who sought to equate amnesia and avoidance with the national interest or national honor, or again to misuse the discourse of patriotism for their own purposes. For him, memory, not avoidance, of a difficult past was a matter of national honor.
36 Ibid., 227. 37 Ibid., 1656. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. 40 As the focus of this paper is on memory of the Holocaust, I am not including material on Heuss's commemoration of the anti-Hitler conspiracy of July 20, 1944. On this see Divided Memory, chapters 8 and 9. On July 20, 1954, the tenth anniversary of the plot to kill Hitler, Heuss delivered a speech to students at the Free University in West Berlin in praise of the resistance. As was his custom, Heuss consulted a wide range of intellectuals and scholars. On July 9, 1954 Hans Bott, director of Heuss's office, wrote to Max Horkheimer for suggestions of how best to commemorate the tenth anniversary. On July 12, 1954 Horkheimer sent a remarkable reply. In view of assertions that praise for the conspirators of July 20, 1944 served to legitimate a conservative restoration in the Federal Republic, the arguments of one of the most prominent of Germany's left-liberal intellectuals about their legacy for a new democracy were particularly significant. "In Germany", Horkheimer wrote, "there is much too little thought given to those who, during the years of horror, saved the name of humanity." The toooften forgotten members of the German resistance "deserve… greater love." Even if one does not share the conspirator political views, "nevertheless their act expressed the yearning for the whole." Horkheimer stressed that "a great deal would be gained if, in the new Germany events, such as those of July 20 th would serve to educate its citizens. This would accomplish far more than expression of abstract respect for democracy as such. Democracy is a vague concept, which has no automatic link to freedom and justice. It demands the spontaneity of the individual, which cannot be exhausted in formal principles. One of the few survivors of the July 20 plot was once asked how he could participate in the enterprise when he must have known that should it fail he would face a fate worse than death. He responded that the existing state of affairs was so unbearable that everything, every torture and every ordeal was preferable [to tolerating the status quo]. It is this spirit of the determinate negation (das bestimmle Nein) that needs to play such a decisive role in not fully articulated goals and programs. Practitioners of Realpolitik alltoo gladly dismiss it as hazy and remote from reality. Yet in this spirit there lies that concrete connection to the possibility of something better. Its realization depends on it." "Hans Bott to Max Horkheimer" (July 9, 1954); and "Max Horkheimer to Hans Bott", (July 12, 1954 Today we must decide. After a debate lasting nineteen years, do we want to build a memorial to the murdered Jews of Europe in Berlin? Again and again, I hear that all of the arguments have been made. But I also hear that we, the Germans, are no longer free in our decision. The public as well as the international pressure is so great that the decision has in effect already been made. To that I say: this is our, yes, our decision to make, one that we take from our sense of responsibility with a view to our own national history and to the conditions of its memory. 48 Thierse went on to reject calls for a Schlubstrich and praised the founders of the citizen's initiative supporting the memorial in Berlin. Then, in phrases reminiscent of Heuss and Schumacher, Thierse concluded as follows: "The memorial that is the subject of today's decision aims at future generations with the message: Shame is a moment of our human dignity. Moral duties in the present and capacity to master the future grow from political and practical reflection on our history, one bound up with unimaginable injustice." Jeffrey Herf, "Legacies of Divided Memory for German Debates about the Holocaust in the 1990s", German Politics and Society 52, Vol. 17, No. 3, Fall 1999, pp. 9-34. 
